Where Is The 'Decisive Battle' of Mosul?

It's almost like Time Magazine was reading my mind. Their article here asks the question of what the heck has happened to the big battle in Mosul that would mean the final phase of taking out al Qaeda in the north. The U.S. had laid the groundwork for the Mosul offensive and then Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki had waded in with those now famous words of an Iraqi "decisive battle" in Mosul but to this point there simply has been little progress.
The reason is complex - not meaning it's a complex issue but that Mosul is complex. Here's an excerpt from the article that helps explain it:

Col. Michael Bills, the commander for U.S. forces in Mosul, has ruled out using so-called Concerned Local Citizens (CLC), bands of irregulars working alongside American and Iraqi troops in parts of Baghdad, Anbar Province and other areas of Iraq. "You got such a melting pot it's difficult to even fathom trying to do a CLC up here," Bills said of the Mosul area, where the population is complex mix of Iraq's ethnic and sectarian groups. The territory around Mosul has long been home to Kurds, Sunnis, Christians, Shi'ites, Yazidis and Turkmens.

In Anbar, where there was so much success it was fairly easy for the U.S. to target in on al Qaeda after the Sunni tribes had come on board because those Sunnis were quick to point out the al Qaeda fighters and sympathizers. In Mosul, you have such a myriad of ethnic and religious groups that there isn't a good chain of dialogue let alone unification against al Qaeda. I imagine there is already distrust between the groups normally living there.
So, we are looking at a long battle here...similar to Ramadi and Fallujah. And also, just another example of why Maliki needs to let the U.S. and IA leaders make statements about military options and goals, not him.

Where's the 'Decisive Battle' for Mosul?

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has vowed to wage a "decisive battle" against insurgents in Mosul, which U.S. and Iraqi officials say is their last urban haven. But U.S. forces trying to stamp out insurgent networks in that city lack a major boon the surge effort had elsewhere in Iraq over the past year: Local volunteer fighters.

Bills fears any efforts to organize volunteer fighters to set against insurgents could backfire, igniting tensions among the disparate communities. "What ethnic group do you go after?" Bills said. "You just can't start something like that, because I think tensions will start between different CLC groups."
The absence in Mosul of local volunteers, who are typically paid about $300 per month by U.S. forces elsewhere in Iraq, means American troops have more difficulty finding insurgents in the population. One of the most valuable things such fighters brought to the table over the past year across Iraq is a knowledge of who exactly the insurgents in their areas were. U.S. military officials estimate that roughly 300 hardcore fighters operate in Mosul, chiefly on the predominately Sunnni west side of the city. Attacks there are 50% higher than elsewhere in Mosul, according to Lt. Col. Michael Simmering, a commander at the main U.S. outpost in Mosul, Forward Operating Base Marez. But so far U.S. and Iraqi forces have failed to rein in the fighters, who stage daily attacks around the city. "The insurgents do have the ability to move around the city freely," said Simmering.