Afghanistan Expert Foresees the Inevitable Fall of Afghanistan To the Taliban

This is really an excellent article from MEMRI that details the future of Afghanistan out incredibly to the finest detail - what precipitated the article is certainly the announced deadline from President Obama of next July 2011 when U.S. troops are to be withdrawn from Afghanistan. And the authors of this piece don't mince words - they call for the eventual takeover by the Taliban and go through the process that it will take.

From the article:

As U.S. troops begin to withdraw from Afghanistan in July 2011, an emerging fragile Afghan state under Hamid Karzai appears to be headed for a likely takeover by the Taliban.

Three major forces will impact the situation in Afghanistan: Pakistan, the U.S., and to a lesser degree India and Iran. An internal and regional power struggle will result. In fact, the regional powers have already begun to assert themselves with a view to acquiring a foothold in the power structure that will emerge after the U.S.'s exit. Recently, India has been turning to Iran to forge a common position on Afghanistan. And while the U.S. is seeking a return of the Russian presence to Afghanistan,[1] the Russian ambassador to New Delhi opposes the U.S.'s ''hastened withdrawal'' from Afghanistan because it could lead to ''hell.''[2]

As the U.S. troops leave, Pakistan will have the grand impact on Afghanistan. During the 1980s, the ISI, working in cooperation with the CIA, established a strong presence in Afghanistan which Pakistan regards as its strategic backyard. After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, various Afghan warlords and the mujahideen leaders could not form a stable government in Kabul. In the mid-1990s, the ISI propped up the Taliban to restore order and establish Pakistan's control in Afghanistan. Even now, the Taliban are controlled by the ISI. The current Pakistani policy is to bring back the Taliban and to revive the policy of strategic depth in Afghanistan.

It's interesting to see this angle on the future of Afghanistan as we appear to see that country's future shaped by the likes of Iran and Russia and Pakistan - not much of a mention of the United States as I guess the authors of this piece see Barack Hussein Obama as pulling the plug completely.

I'd like to add that although some countries feel they might be able to shape Afghanistan's future - I don't see it that way. I look at it very simply. If the U.S. and NATO leave, it's the Taliban's country. Simple as that.

And just so everyone is aware of what that means - it means an instantaneous return to pre-2001 where al Qaeda was welcome in the country and actually supported, funded and provided training camps. Al Qaeda has worked pretty hard to help the Taliban win back Afghanistan and they will be hansomely rewarded. And for those of us in America, we'll get to sit back and wait for the next 9/11 attack times 20. Anyone else want to see if we can't win this war and stop that possibility?

Heading Towards a Taliban Takeover of Afghanistan


I. The U.S. Exit – Emerging Chaos and Taliban Takeover

As U.S. troops begin to withdraw from Afghanistan in July 2011, an emerging fragile Afghan state under Hamid Karzai appears to be headed for a likely takeover by the Taliban.

Three major forces will impact the situation in Afghanistan: Pakistan, the U.S., and to a lesser degree India and Iran. An internal and regional power struggle will result. In fact, the regional powers have already begun to assert themselves with a view to acquiring a foothold in the power structure that will emerge after the U.S.'s exit. Recently, India has been turning to Iran to forge a common position on Afghanistan. And while the U.S. is seeking a return of the Russian presence to Afghanistan,[1] the Russian ambassador to New Delhi opposes the U.S.'s ''hastened withdrawal'' from Afghanistan because it could lead to ''hell.''[2]

The emerging situation in Afghanistan will be primarily characterized by disorder: The federal government's ability to govern will be limited to Kabul and some cities; vast regions will be controlled by the Taliban; and various Afghan leaders will maneuver to fill in the power vacuum and will position themselves as successor to Karzai, who cannot run for another term. The instability will be similar to what it was after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

II. Karzai's Survival – Short Term Only

Amid a power vacuum that will originate around the time of the U.S. forces' exit, Hamid Karzai has a chance of surviving in power for the short term only. He will be in a slightly better position to lead the fragile Afghan state than Najibullah was when the Soviets left Afghanistan. Being in power at the head of a fragile state, Karzai will become a target for the Taliban and other opposition parties. The chances of Karzai's surviving this chaotic phase, and his eventual exit from the scene will be determined largely by the U.S.-supported secret peace talks between the Karzai government and the Taliban. The militants are already in control of vast swathes of Afghanistan and are backed by the Pakistani military's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the most powerful regional force.

The Obama administration's Afghanistan policy has been characterized by three phases: a) during the initial months of U.S. President Barack Obama's term, his officials favored peace talks with the Taliban; b) later, the officials resisted Karzai's continuation in power and opposed any peace talks until the Taliban were subdued through military operations; and c) finally, they forced Karzai to embrace these inimical forces, especially through engaging Pakistan, thereby weakening him and foreclosing a visible path for the U.S. to succeed in Afghanistan. Despite U.S. criticisms against him over corruption, Karzai's chances of surviving through a transition phase will be impacted to a large extent by the following:

a) Support of Afghan Allies
Karzai is backed by almost all former warlords and mujahideen leaders who fought against the Soviets during the 1980s, including Burhanuddin Rabbani, Abd Rab Al-Rasul Sayyaf and Abdul Rashid Dostum. A key mujahideen leader who is not supporting him, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar of Hizb-e-Islami, is nevertheless engaged in peace talks.

b) Support from U.S. and NATO Forces
The Karzai regime will enjoy the strength derived from the presence of U.S. troops who may remain in Afghanistan in some form. The U.S. and the NATO countries have no option but – in adhering to the democratic process underway in Afghanistan – to work with Karzai during a transition period.

c) Support from Evolving State Institutions
The evolving state institutions in Afghanistan such as the military, the police, the bureaucracy and the justice system, though weak in their early years, will strengthen Karzai's hand significantly. Over the past half-century or so, elections have emerged as turning points, and in their wake they leave irreversible imprints on a nation's life. Although the August 20, 2009 Afghan presidential elections were tainted by corruption, elections are currently the only UN-mandated democratic process in Afghanistan that offer legitimacy to the government. The September 18 parliamentary polls will indirectly broaden the political basis on which Karzai may survive the next few years.

d) Support from Regional Allies
Karzai will receive support from regional allies like India (because of its opposition to the Taliban and Pakistan) and also from Iran (because of its opposition to the anti-Shi'ite Taliban and the Sunni state of Pakistan). Notwithstanding the reports of Iranian support to a section of the Taliban, India and Iran have matching interests in the creation of an independent Afghanistan; they will prefer Karzai for the time being, or a staunch anti-Taliban Afghan leader like former intelligence chief Amrullah Saleh, over the Sunni jihadist force of the Taliban seizing power in Kabul. Pushed into the corner by the Obama administration, Karzai too has recently been courting Iran.

e) An Unexpected Factor
A totally unexpected factor may help the Karzai regime to stay in power. For example, as a result of the U.S. withdrawal, the Taliban will emerge as the most powerful force in Afghanistan and some of the militant groups among them may attempt to march toward Islamabad to capture power in Pakistan. Such a possibility almost became reality in 2009, when the Taliban launched the enforcement of Islamic Shari'a in Pakistan's Swat district and began marching into neighboring districts on the way to Islamabad. An attempt by the Taliban to move from Afghanistan into Pakistan may force the U.S. to stay put in Afghanistan and support the Karzai government.

III. The ISI-Taliban Machine and the Threat to Karzai

Karzai has been pressured by the Obama administration to engage Pakistan for a quick solution to the Afghan problem. Such pressure from the U.S. is a direct result of the Pakistani establishment's diplomatic offensive in convincing the Obama administration officials to accept the view that peace is impossible in Afghanistan without Pakistan's cooperation. The Obama administration has imbibed the Inter-Services Intelligence's (ISI) viewpoint on Afghanistan, especially with regard to India's role in the country, but has ignored the fact that the ISI's support to the militants is the root of the problem in Afghanistan.

Under pressure from the Obama administration to engage Pakistan, Karzai agreed to Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan during his May 2010 visit to Washington, DC. However, at a discussion at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Karzai pointed out that most of the Taliban leaders are in neighboring Pakistan.[3] His point that the Taliban are controlled by ISI is known internationally. Even when he is willing to engage Pakistan under U.S. pressure, the problem Karzai is facing is the double-edged policy of the ISI, which while mediating talks with the Taliban, is also encouraging the Taliban to fight. The Taliban's influence is now consequential in all provinces of Afghanistan.

Karzai has always favored reintegration of the low-ranking Taliban militants into Afghan society, as opposed to the Pakistani view of reconciliation with the core Taliban leaders. Under U.S. pressure, Karzai has been forced to give a substantial role to the ISI. The premise of the ISI-sponsored reconciliation process is that some Taliban leaders favored by the ISI will be part of a power structure in Kabul that will replace Karzai. As long as Mullah Omar, the Emir of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, is around the corner and has chances of returning to power, Karzai will not be able to maintain his rule for long. The ISI's involvement with Karzai is transient and tactical in nature. It should be kept in mind here that it is the ISI, not the elected civilian government in Islamabad, which dictates Pakistan's foreign policy.

IV. Pakistan's Grand Impact

As the U.S. troops leave, Pakistan will have the grand impact on Afghanistan. During the 1980s, the ISI, working in cooperation with the CIA, established a strong presence in Afghanistan which Pakistan regards as its strategic backyard. After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, various Afghan warlords and the mujahideen leaders could not form a stable government in Kabul. In the mid-1990s, the ISI propped up the Taliban to restore order and establish Pakistan's control in Afghanistan. Even now, the Taliban are controlled by the ISI. The current Pakistani policy is to bring back the Taliban and to revive the policy of strategic depth in Afghanistan.

Pakistan had to rescind its diplomatic recognition of the Taliban regime after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. However, it kept hoping that the Taliban will return to power in Kabul. Pakistan's worry has been that when the U.S. leaves Afghanistan without a political settlement to its liking, it might not be able to secure its interests there. It has worried that an independent Afghanistan will raise the issue of Pakistan-Afghanistan border demarcation, which Kabul does not recognize. It is concerned that Afghanistan will also raise the issue of the continuing movement of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants across the border. However, the Obama administration has successfully forced Karzai to engage Pakistan. The Pakistani foreign policy on Afghanistan and all engagements with Karzai are being coordinated exclusively through the powerful duo of Pakistan Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani and Lt.-Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, who succeeded General Kayani as the chief of the ISI. Pakistan's long-held wish to see the return of the Taliban in Kabul appears to be nearer than ever.

Even while the Afghan president is now building a relationship with the ISI, it is unlikely that the Pakistani military will accept an independent Afghanistan and forego Pakistan's entrenched perception which views Afghanistan as strategic depth, in other words as a client state. In recent years, Pakistani leaders have tried to counter international concerns over the Pakistani military's idea of strategic depth in Afghanistan. Their argument is that the Pakistani military no longer holds on to this theory. However, contrary to this claim, Pakistan has been pursuing a policy of neo-strategic depth, as per which the ISI thinks that Afghanistan should not fall under Indian influence. The ISI will not accept a leader like Karzai in the long run, especially in view of his strong associations with India and also with Iran recently.

Therefore, it is expected that the ISI-Taliban machine will act against Hamid Karzai as soon as pro-Pakistan Afghan leaders gain a say in the power structure in Kabul. This will lead to the reversal of the ISI's current tactical policy of engaging Karzai. It will also create a challenge for the stability of the emerging Afghan state and put Karzai's life in imminent danger. The Pakistani military's policy of neo-strategic depth and successful revival of the Taliban is complete. With the U.S. forcing Karzai to engage Pakistan, the path for the ISI-sponsored Taliban to take over Kabul has been now paved. As the U.S. quits Afghanistan, it is Pakistan that will have the grand impact in Kabul.